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THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND
THE HYPOTHESIS OF A QUIESCENT UNIVERSE
William Lane Craig

Although Stewart Goetz is correct that the kalam cosmological argument does
not rule out the possibility that the finite temporal series of past events was
initiated by a distinct personal agent in an eternal, quiescent universe, this
does not appreciably mitigate the force of the argument for theism. For the
atheist will hardly be inclined to admit the existence of an eternal, changeless,
personal Prime Mover rather than the fact that the universe began to exist.
Moreover, since the existence of a quiescent universe is physically impossible, it could have existed only by means of a miracle so stupendous that it
involved the suspension of all the laws of nature. The Prime Mover would
thus have to be Lord over all the universe, a conclusion which even a successful kalam argument for the beginning of the universe does not attain.
Stewart Goetz's recent, brief critique' of the kalam cosmological argument
disputes the second premiss of that argument-that the universe began to
exist-by denying, not that an infinite temporal regress of events is impossible, but that the finitude of the series of past events implies that the uni verse
had a beginning. He contends that in my defense of the kalam argument 2 I
have failed to refute the hypothesis of a perfectly quiescent universe into
which change was introduced a finite time ago by a personal agent.
Although there is, I believe, a substantive objection to the kalam argument
contained in Goetz's critique, it is unfortunately obscured by his misconstruction of my argument. Indeed, many of the points which Goetz makes are an
essential part of my own argument that the temporal first cause of the universe
is a personal Creator. A re-examination of the original context will reveal
that most of his objections were anticipated in The Kalam Cosmological
Argument. 3
The argument takes as given the existence of the material universe and asks
whether the universe had or had not a beginning. After determining that the
universe did begin to exist, it asks whether or not that beginning was caused.
Concluding that the beginning of the universe was caused, the argument
proceeds to show that that cause was personal rather than impersonal.
In showing that the universe began to exist, the argument relies upon
various proofs that an infinite temporal regress of events is impo~sible. This
would serve to convince most people that the universe began to exist (as Kant
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assumes in the thesis of his First Antinomy concerning time), but "for the
sake of completeness" I introduced at this point the hypothesis of the medieval Islamic theologian al-' Allaf that the temporal series of events was preceded by an eternal, quiescent universe. Against this hypothesis I then
presented the following disjunctive syllogism:
1. Either the universe began to exist or the finite temporal regress of events

was preceded by an eternal, absolutely quiescent universe.
2. The finite temporal regress of events was not preceded by an eternal,
absolutely quiescent universe.
3. Therefore the universe began to exist.
Goetz apparently agrees with (1), since he does not dispute the impossibility
of an infinite temporal regress of events. But he denies that (2) has been
proven because it is possible that a personal agent distinct from the universe
initiated the temporal series of events by causing a first event in the quiescent
universe. He then exposits my defense of (2), "in response to this objection."4
But it should be evident that my defense of (2) is not at all in response to
this objection. On the contrary, I should agree that what Goetz envisions is
possible. In fact, I entertained and rejected this hypothesis in the context of
a process theological view of the universe as the body of God: "To retreat to
the position that God and the world lay dormant from eternity and began a
process of mutual development a finite number of years ago completely
removes any rationale for process theology, since according to this school,
process and development are essential to God's very nature, and he cannot
exist without development."5
Rather my arguments in support of (2) are aimed at an atheistic, materialist
view of the universe. Hence, all of what Goetz says on p. 101 of his article
is completely misdirected. On the contrary, the notion of agent causation
plays an essential role in my later argument that the temporal First Cause of
the universe must be a personal Creator:
... while it is true that no mechanical cause existing from eternity could create
the universe in time, such a production of a temporal effect from an eternal
cause is possible if and only if the cause is a personal agent who wills from
eternity to create a temporally finite effect. For while a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions would either produce the effect
from eternity or not at all, a personal being may freely choose to create at
any time wholly apart from any distinguishing conditions of one moment
from another. 6
Of course, one could say that the first effect caused by this personal being is
not the creation of the universe, but some initial movement in the quiescent
universe. Creatio ex nihilo would not then be proved, but as I employ it the
kalam cosmological argument's primary aim is to support theism, not creatio
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ex nihilo. The price of the quiescent universe hypothesis is admitting the
existence of an eternal, changeless, uncaused, timeless, immaterial, spaceless,
personal Prime Mover7 -a hypothesis very suggestive of theism and hardly
one which the atheist will at this point be prepared to accept! Hence, while
Goetz is correct that my philosophical argument in behalf of (2) does not
exclude the possibility that there exists a personal being who initiates the
temporal series of events into a quiescent universe, that still leaves the atheist
with a very uncomfortable dilemma:
4. Either the universe began to exist or the temporal series of events was
initiated in an eternal, quiescent universe by a transcendent, personal
being.

Confronted with such a dilemma, the non-theist may well prefer to accept the
first horn of the dilemma in the hope that he can stave off the conclusions
that this beginning was caused or that the cause of the beginning was personal.
That dilemma can be made even more uncomfortable by considering my
second line of defense for (2), which Goetz unfortunately omits altogether,
namely, that an eternal, quiescent universe is simply physically impossible.
In The Kalam Cosmological Argument I briefly explain three empirical reasons why such a scenario is physically untenable: (i) Such a universe would
have to exist at a temperature of absolute zero, which is physically impossible, (ii) Matter in the early stages of the universe was anything but cold, being
collapsed into a volatile fireball with temperatures in excess of billions of
degrees Kelvin, and (iii) In a lump of matter frozen (per impossible) at
absolute zero, no first event could occur.s To these may be added the quantum
physical consideration that the quantum mechanical vacuum, which is conceived to underlie all physical reality, far from being quiescent, is a sea of
continually forming and dissolving particle-antiparticle pairs. Even if we do
not interpret this picture realistically, it is clear that the quantum mechanical
vacuum is the scene of intense activity, which has observable consequences
for atomic structure and concerning which detailed predictions are confirmed
by experiment to one part in a billion. 9 This implies that the physical, spacetime universe is fundamentally and inherently in flux, as Milton K. Munitz
explains:
From the point of view of a typical quantum field theory, even the most
perfect vacuum, as a physical reality, is the scene of intense activity. Accordingly, the term 'vacuum,' in these contexts, has a specially, radically different
meaning from the one it has in popular usage or in traditional physics. A
vacuum state is not an absolute void; it is not to be identified with wholly
empty space. Any quantum field with which a vacuum state is associated may
be thought of as made up of separate centers of oscillation and excitation ....
Even in the absence of real particles ... quantum theory allows for the possi-
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bility of the existence of a field and its fluctuations. The quantum mechanical
vacuum is not quiescent. 1o

But what the above implies is that the existence of an eternal, quiescent
universe is naturally impossible; that is to say, the existence of such a universe would be quite literally a miracle, indeed, when one reflects on what
would be involved in such a thing, a miracle of the most stupendous proportions conceivable, since it would involve suspension of all the laws of nature.
Thus, this alternative to the beginning of the universe involves much more
than the postulate of a transcendent, personal Prime Mover: it implies the
existence of a being who is also the sovereign Lord over all the universe and
its every most minute operation, a startling conclusion to which even the
kalam cosmological argument does not lead us. The dilemma posed, therefore, by the demonstration that the temporal regress of events is not infinite
is
5. Either the universe began to exist or the temporal series of events was
initiated by a transcendent, personal being who miraculously preserved
the universe from eternity in a quiescent state.

One might proceed to argue against the latter horn of the dilemma, for example, by emphasizing the utterly pointless nature of such an exercise; but
we may let that pass. For the salient point is that the latter horn of the dilemma
is as suggestive of theism as the former.
Goetz's objection, while perhaps precluding a strict demonstration of
creatio ex nihilo, therefore does little to diminish the force of the kalam
cosmological argument in support of theism.
Westmont College; Catholic University of Louvain

NOTES
1. Stewart C. Goetz, "Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument," Faith and Philosophy
6 (1989): 99-102.
2. William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Library of Philosophy and
Religion (London: Macmillan, 1979).
3. A further issue raised by the quiescent universe hypothesis, but not discussed by
Goetz, is whether a spatial object must not also be a temporal object. In The Kalam
Cosmological Argumellt I inclined toward a relational theory of time which would permit
the possibility that an entity might be spatial without being temporal. But Sidney Shoemaker provides a persuasive argument that even if the universe were frozen into immobility, temporal passage would still continue according to an apparently intrinsic metric,
as Newton believed (Sidney Shoemaker, "Time without Change," Journal 0/ Philosophy
66 [1969]: 363-81; cf. W. H. Newton-Smith, The Structure o/Time, International Library
of Philosophy [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980], chaps. 4, 10). Would this
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argument imply that an eternal, quiescent universe into which change is initiated was also
a spatio-temporal reality? Since the reasoning of kalam can be applied to metric time as
well as to events, an affirmative answer would require that time itself began to exist and
that, therefore, the quiescent universe, since it is a spatio-temporal reality, must have begun
to exist, which goes to prove creatio ex nihilo. In such a case, God creates time as well
as the universe.
4. Goetz, "Cosmological Argument,H p. 99.
5. Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 170.

6. Ibid., p. 151; cf. pp. 149-53. Notice, too, that I was not trying to give an analysis of
causality in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions alone; my emphasis is on
mechanical vs. personal causation.
7. On these various attributes, see Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument, pp. 149-53;
a little reflection shows that they are entailed by Goetz's hypothesis.
8. Ibid., pp. 101-02.
9. Jolm D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Allthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 440.
10. Milton K. Munitz, Cosmic Understanding (princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), p. 132. Cf. Wheeler's remark:
"The term 'quantum fluctuations' ... stands for a movement that can never be
frozen out, however low the temperature. Such fluctuations are universal. ...
In the frozen vacuum of quantum electrodynamics the electric and magnetic
fields both fluctuate .... Thus all space at the quantum scale of distances
is ... everywhere the scene of the most violent smallscale fluctuations in the
electromagnetic field"
(John Archibald Wheeler, "Superspace and the Nature of Quantum Geometrodynamics,"
in Quantum Cosmology, ed. Li Zhi Fang and Perno Ruffini, Advanced Studies in Astrophysics and Cosmology 3 [Singapore: World Scientific, 1987], p. 40).

